pean Commission, would like to introduce filtering obligations for intermediaries in both copyright and AVMS legislations. Meanwhile, online platforms have already set up miscellaneous filtering schemes on a voluntary basis. In this paper, I suggest that we are witnessing the death of "no monitoring obligations," a well-marked trend in intermediary liability policy that can be contextualized within the emergence of a broader move towards private enforcement online and intermediaries' self-intervention. In addition, filtering and monitoring will be dealt almost exclusively through automatic infringement assessment systems. Due process and fundamental guarantees get mauled by algorithmic enforcement, which might finally slay "no monitoring obligations" and fundamental rights online, together with the untameable monster.
Abstract:
In imposing a strict liability regime for alleged copyright infringement occurring on YouTube, Justice Salomão of the Brazilian Superior Tribunal de Justiça stated that "if Google created an 'untameable monster,' it should be the only one charged with any disastrous consequences generated by the lack of control of the users of its websites." In order to tame the monster, the Brazilian Superior Court had to impose monitoring obligations on Youtube; this was not an isolated case. Proactive monitoring and filtering found their way into the legal system as a privileged enforcement strategy through legislation, judicial decisions, and private ordering. In multiple jurisdictions, recent case law has imposed proactive monitoring obligations on intermediaries across the entire spectrum of intermediary liability subject matters. Legislative proposals have followed suit. As part of its Digital Single Market Strategy, the Euro-A. Introduction 1 In the next few pages, I will be telling you a story that is in between a dark fairy tale and mystery fiction. This story is filled with monsters-untamable onesand its protagonist has been murdered or at least might be in danger of sudden death. However, let us start from the beginning as any good story is supposed to start.
2 Once upon a time there was "no monitoring obligation." Traditionally, online service providers have enjoyed an exemption to any general obligation to monitor the information, which they transmit or store or actively seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity. 1 Together with safe harbor provisions that impose liability on hosting providers according to knowledge-and-take-down, 2 the "no 200 3 monitoring obligations" rule set up a negligencebased intermediary liability system. Online hosting providers may become liable only if they do not take down allegedly infringing materials promptly enough upon knowledge of their existence, usually given by a notice from interested third-parties. 3 Although imperfect because of considerable chilling effects, 4 a negligence-based intermediary liability system has inherent built-in protections for fundamental rights. The European Court of Justice has confirmed multiple times-at least with regard to copyright infringement-that there is no room for proactive monitoring and filtering mechanisms under EU law. 5 Again, the Joint Declaration of the Three Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of Expression calls against the imposition of duties to monitor the legality of the activity taking place within the intermediaries' services. 6 3 However, rumor has it that the principle of "no monitoring obligations"-and the negligencebased system it propels-might be in great danger, if it has not been killed off already. A fundamental tenet of online intermediaries' governance has been 3 Please consider that there is no direct relation between liability and exemptions, which function as an extra layer of protection intended to harmonize at the EU level conditions to limit intermediary liability. increasingly challenged. 7 Who killed-or is trying to kill-"no monitoring obligations"? And why? The predicament in which the principle of no proactive monitoring finds itself is the result of miscellaneous concomitant factors and spans all subject matters relevant to intermediary liability online. In search of the culprit, this paper will investigate recent case law, law reform, and private ordering. As per Justice Salomão's metaphor, the dangers for "no monitoring obligations" might follow as reaction to a fear for technological innovation that has posed unprecedented challenges to semiotic governance.
5 By evoking the untamable monster, Justice Salomão echoes a recurrent narrative in recent intermediary liability-especially copyright-policy. This narrative has focused on the "threat" posed by digitalisation and internet distribution. 10 It has led to overreaching expansion of online enforcement. The Court in Dafra stressed the importance of imposing liability on intermediaries, stating that "violations of privacy of individuals and companies, summary trials and public lynching of innocents are routinely reported, all practiced in the worldwide web with substantially increased damage because of the widespread nature of this medium of expression. 32 In other words, the Commission would like to impose an obligation on online platforms to behave responsibly by addressing specific problems. 33 Online platforms would be invested by a duty to 'ensure a safe online environment' against illegal activities.
34 Hosting providers-especially platforms-would be called to actively and swiftly remove illegal materials, instead of reacting to complaints. They would be called to adopt effective voluntary 'proactive measures to detect and remove illegal content online' 35 and are encouraged to do so by using automatic detection and filtering technologies. 36 As the Commission puts it, the goal is "to engage with platforms in setting up and applying voluntary cooperation mechanisms" 37 , in particular by setting up a privileged channel with 'trusted flaggers', competent authorities and specialized private entities with specific expertise in identifying illegal content'.
38
9 The adoption of voluntary filtering measures does expand beyond intellectual property enforcement to reach speech-related crimes. "Online platforms must be encouraged to take more effective voluntary action to curtail exposure to illegal or harmful content" such as incitement to terrorism, child sexual abuse and hate speech. 39 As an umbrella framework, the Commission recently agreed with all major online hosting providers-including Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Microsofton a code of conduct that includes a series of commitments to combat the spread of illegal hate speech online in Europe. 40 This could include recruitment videos or violent terrorist imagery or memes. When one company identifies and removes such a piece of content, the others will be able to use the hash to identify and remove the same piece of content from their own network. The fingerprints will help identify image and video content that are "most likely to violate all of our respective companies' content policies".
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Despite the collaboration, the task of defining removal policies will remain within the remit of each platform.
45

D. Case Law
10 As mentioned, voluntary monitoring and filtering schemes emerged as a response to major lawsuits threatening online intermediaries. In fact, private ordering confirms a trend in recent intermediary liability policy that surfaced consistently in judicial decisions. 46 In multiple jurisdictions, case law has imposed proactive monitor obligations on online intermediaries for copyright infringement. reuters.com/article/us-internet-extremism-videoexclusive-idUSKCN0ZB00M> (apparently, the "automatic" removal of extremist content is only about automatically identifying duplicate copies of video that were already removed through human review). However, proactive monitoring obligations have been spanning the entire spectrum of intermediary liability subject matters: intellectual property, privacy, defamation, and hate/dangerous speech.
11 Proactive monitoring obligations have been applied by courts on the basis of miscellaneous doctrines attempting to impose strict liability rather than negligence-based standards to intermediaries.
47
In Europe, for example, the eCommerce Directive also contains a provision that dilutes the noticeand-take-down principle by extending in specific circumstances liability beyond the liability upon knowledge. According to Art. 14(3) further obligations can be imposed by court or authority orders "requiring the service provider to terminate and prevent an infringement." 48 In this respect, the eCommerce Directive prohibits general monitoring obligations, although it does allow national law to provide for monitoring obligations "in a specific case." 49 The eCommerce Directive also acknowledges that Member States can impose duties of care on hosting providers "in order to detect and prevent certain types of illegal activities."
50 However, their scope should not extend to general monitoring obligations, if any meaning should be given to the previous statement in Recital 47 that only specific monitoring obligations are allowed. Moreover, the Directive states that duties of care should "reasonably be expected from the service providers," and no general monitoring obligation can fulfill such an expectation as they are explicitly barred by the Directive itself. 51 In order to distinguish general from specific monitoring obligations, it should be considered that (1) as an exception, specific monitoring obligations must be interpreted narrowly, (2) both the scope of the possible infringements and the amount of infringements that can be reasonably expected to be identified, must be sufficiently narrow, and (3) it must be obvious which materials constitute an infringement. 52 As Van Eecke noted 12 Although space limitation necessary constricts the scope of this review, this section will select several cases in multiple jurisdictions where monitoring obligations have been imposed. As said, this case law deals with the entire variety of potential infringements that may trigger online intermediary liability, proving that-also at the judicial level-the emergence of proactive monitoring obligations is a global intermediary liability policy trend. However, notable exceptions to this emerging trend-such as the landmark Belen case in Argentina-will also be considered.
I. Copyright: From Dafra to Baidu
13 Multiple judicial decisions have imposed proactive monitoring obligations for copyright infringement on hosting providers. Let us start by going back to the beginning of our story then. As mentioned earlier, the Brazilian STJ imposed proactive monitoring obligations on YouTube. 54 The Brazilian STJ found Google liable for copyright infringement for YouTube-hosted videos parodying a well-known commercial. 55 As such, Dafra stands as a perfect case study regarding the effects of filtering on freedom of expression online. Dafra is a motorcycle manufacturer, which broadcasted a commercial titled "Meetings," as part of a national advertising campaign known as "Dafra -You on Top." 56 Shortly after launching the advertising campaign, a YouTube user published a "fan-dub" of the original Dafra video. 57 In the user-generated parody version of Dafra's commercial, the actor's original voice was replaced by a very similar one making statements tarnishing Dafra's goodwill. 58 Google took down the initial video per Dafra's request, but several other versions of the video were posted constantly by other users under different titles. 59 Therefore, Dafra sued Google for copyright infringement, claiming that Google had not adopted the necessary measures to avoid further viewing of videos with the same 53 59 See Dafra (n 9) § 1.
content, regardless of the title that users may have given to those videos. 60 The plaintiff had asked Google not only to remove the video but also to use search blocking mechanisms to prevent posting any unauthorized material related to the "Dafra -You on Top" campaign on YouTube.
61
14 The STJ upheld the plaintiff's claims for copyright infringement and ordered Google to remove all the adulterated advertisements within 24 hours, under a penalty of R$ 500 per day for noncompliance.
62
According to the decision, Google must remove not only the infringing video, which is the object of the lawsuit, but also any similar and related unauthorized videos, even if they are uploaded by other users and bear a different title. 63 However, the Court recognized "certain limitations of proactive control." 64 The judgment does not address future videos and Google's obligation only reaches unauthorized videos with "DafraYou on Top" in the title. 65 In fact, Google claimed a "technical impossibility" defense, arguing that it was impossible to take down all videos because there are currently no blocking filters able to identify all infringing materials.
66 Justice Salomão-the rapporteur of the case-quashed Google's "technical impossibility defense" because lack of technical solutions for fixing a defective new product does not exempt the manufacturer from liability, or from the obligation of providing a solution. 67 If Google created an 'untamable monster,'-Justice Salomão continued-"it should be the only one charged with any disastrous consequences generated by the lack of control of the users of its websites. Notably, the appellate decision reversed the first instance on the issue of costs allocation. According to the Court of Appeal, all costs related to blocking and delisting sixteen Allostreaming websites should be sustained by the search engines, rather than being equally shared as previously decided.
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As to be considered later, the stand taken by the Paris Court of Appeal has obvious implications in regard to the inadequate balance with freedom to conduct business that monitoring obligations might bring about as discussed multiple times by the CJEU. In laying down its arguments for proactive monitoring and cost allocation, Allostreaming also evokes the specter of the untamable monster. The Court remarked that rightholders are "confronted with a massive attack" and are "heavily threatened by the massive piracy of their works." 72 Hence, the Court continues, it is "legitimate and in accordance with the principle of proportionality that [ISPs and search engines] contribute to blocking and delisting measures" because they "initiate the activity of making available access to these websites" and "derive economic benefit from this access (especially by advertising displayed on their pages)." 73 Regardless the logic of the argument, proactive monitoring and imposition of liability to innocent third parties is apparently still upheld by endorsing an Internet threat discourse. 77 According to the Court, a hosting provider is not only required to delete files containing copyrighted material as soon as it is notified of a violation by the right holder, but must also take steps to prevent similar infringements by other users in the future.
78 Filehosting services are required to actively monitor incoming links to discover copyrighted files as soon as there is a specific reason to do so and to then ensure that these files become inaccessible to the public. 79 As indicated by the Court, the service provider should use all possible resources -including search engines, Facebook, Twitter, or web crawlers -to identify links made accessible to the public by user generated repositories of links. the Tribunal of Turin. Delta TV sued Google and YouTube for copyright infringement of certain South American soap operas that users had uploaded to YouTube. In this case, Google complied with its notice-and-take-down policy, and the videos were removed as soon as the specific URLs were provided by Delta TV. In one interim decision, the Court agreed with Delta TV's claims and ordered Google and YouTube to remove the infringing videos and to prevent further uploads of the same content through the use of its Content ID software using as a reference the URLs provided by Delta TV. 82 The Court stressed that these proactive monitoring obligations derive from the fact that YouTube is a "new generation" hosting service, a role that brought on it a greater responsibility to protect third parties' rights. 83 More recently, the Tribunal of Turin delivered a final decision on the matter, confirming the previous decision and an obligation for YouTube to partially monitor its network by preventing the re-uploading of content previously removed. 88 According to the High Court of Beijing, by using current technologies, it was reasonable for Baidu to exercise a duty to monitor and examine the legal status of an uploaded work once it has been viewed or downloaded more than a certain number of times. 89 According to the Court, Baidu needs to inspect the potential copyright status of the work by contacting the uploader, checking whether the work is originally created by the uploader or legally authorized by the copyright owners. 90 known public figure-Belen Rodriguez-for violation of her copyright, reputation and privacy. 93 This case is one among numerous civil lawsuits brought against the search engines Google and Yahoo! by different 'celebrities' and well-known public figures for violation of their reputation and privacy. 94 The case discussed the question whether search engines are liable for linking in search results to third-party content that violates fundamental rights or infringes copyright. Initially, some lower courts found search engines strictly liable under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, which imposes liability, regardless of knowledge or intention, to those performing risky acts, such as indexing third party content creating wider audiences for illegitimate content, or serving as the "guardians" of the element that generates the damage, such as the search engine's software. 95 Finally, the Argentinian Supreme Court: (1) repudiated a strict liability standard and adopted a test based on actual knowledge and negligence; (2) requested judicial review for issuing a notice to take down content-except in a few cases of "gross and manifest harm"; and (3) rejected any filtering obligation to prevent infringing links from appearing in the future. 96 In the rather extreme view taken by the Argentinian Supreme Court, as a default rule, actual knowledge-and possibly negligence-would only arise after a judicial review has upheld the issuance of the notice. In any event, this conclusion-and the transaction costs that brings about-is mitigated by a category of cases exempted from judicial review that might finally be quite substantial. Apparently, the Argentinian Supreme Court believes that, if harm is not manifest, a balancing of rights might be necessary, which can be done only by a court of law, rather than a private party. 23 In a later decision, the Bundesgerichtshof tuned down its view of reasonable precautionary means. It noted that manually checking and visually comparing each product offered in an online auction against infringement-which was not clear or obviouswould be unreasonable. 108 In particular, the Court noted that obligations are unreasonable if due to the substantial amount of products offered, the platform's business model would be endangered.
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Offering filtering tools to trade mark holders-as eBay does-in order to perform such manual checks detect pages containing the infringing photos and proactively block new versions of posted images from search results continuously. 115 As per the cost of filtering, the court noted that blocking the search results may be simple and inexpensive, and present technology, such as PhotoDNA, makes it possible to filter not only exact copies of identified images but also modified copies.
116
26 Mosley brought a similar claim against Google in the United Kingdom under Art. 10 of the Data Protection Act 1998-the right to prevent processing likely to cause damage or distress-to oblige the search engine to disable access to pictures infringing on his privacy. 117 Google sought to strike out the claim, on the basis that the order applied for would be incompatible with Articles 13 and 15 of the eCommerce Directive.
118 However, the Court noted, first, that either with regard to the processing of personal data, the protection of individuals is governed solely by the data protection legislation 119 or, at least the two Directives must be read in harmony, giving both, if possible, full effect.
120
Whichever way, the "person whose sensitive personal data has been wrongly processed by an internet service provider [has a legal remedy to] ask the court to order it to take steps to cease to process that data."
121 The court, after noting that "is common ground that existing technology permits Google, without disproportionate effort or expense, to block access to individual images," allowed the claim to go to trial because "evidence may well satisfy a trial judge that [blocking] can be done without impermissible monitoring." violation of the protected rights." 124 According to the Court, notice-and-take-down is "insufficient for the present serious infringement."
125 Apparently, the Court deploys again the "untamable monster" argument as "[g]iven the gravity of the infringement and his efforts so far, [Mosley] is not required to take action against all the major media companiespossibly in the world-distributing these images on their own sites."
126 The Court goes on by saying that the notice of each individual infringement is only an inadequate tool "because the duty to monitor and control would provisionally remain with the plaintiff."
127 Apparently, the Court seems to forget that this is actually the goal that the eCommerce negligence-based liability arrangement would like to achieve. On Google's technical capacity to monitor, the Court believed that if software programmes like PhotoDNA, iWatch and Content-ID and image recognition software that works with so-called robust hash values, are not able to meet the requests of the plaintiff, Google should take measures to be able to prevent future harm occurring to Mosley by developing appropriate software or updating existing software that would "delete and detect or block the infringing content."
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IV. Defamation and Hate Speech:
Delfi and its Progeny 28 In multiple decisions, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) had to consider whether an Internet news portal should be liable for usergenerated comments and obliged to monitor and filter proactively its networks to avoid liability. In a landmark case, the Grand Chamber of ECHR confirmed the judgment previously delivered by the Fifth Section and held that finding Delfi-one of the largest news portals on the Internet in Estonialiable for anonymous comments posted by third parties had not been in breach of its freedom to impart information. 129 In particular:
the case concerned the duties and responsibilities of Internet news portals which provided on a commercial basis a platform for user-generated comments on previously published content and some users -whether identified or anonymous -engaged in clearly unlawful hate speech which infringed the personality rights of others.
130 29 Delfi published an article that mentioned in its title that SLK, a company providing public ferry transportation between the mainland and some islands, "Destroyed Planned Ice Roads," which are public roads over the frozen sea. 131 Although the article was not itself defamatory, it attracted 185 comments including personal threats and offensive language directed against a member of the advisory board of SLK. 132 The target SLK board member was Jewish and several comments had a marked, and in some instances especially ignominious, anti-Semitic flare. 133 Delfi had in place a notice-and-take-down policy.
134 Upon SLK's request for removal of the comments, Delfi promptly removed the comments under its notice-and-take-down obligations. 135 However, Delfi refused SLK's additional claim for non-pecuniary damages.
136
30 After a long-lasting legal battle in Estonian courts, the Estonian Supreme Court upheld previous judgments and reiterated that Delfi is a provider of content services, 137 rather than an information service provider, falling under the e-Commerce Directive. Delfi finally sought redress from the ECHR. The ECHR was asked to strike a balance between freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention and the preservation of personality rights of third persons under Article 8 of the same Convention. 138 The ECHR tackled this conundrum by delineating a narrowly construed scenario in which liability supposedly does not interfere with freedom of expression. 139 In a situation of higherthan-average risk of defamation or hate speech, 140 if comments from non-registered users are allowed, 141 a professionally managed and commercially based Internet news portal should exercise the full extent of control at its disposal-and must go beyond automatic keyword-based filtering or ex-post noticeand-take-down procedures-to avoid liability. 142 In later cases, the European Court of Human Rights has revisited-or best clarified-the issue of liability for Internet intermediaries. In MTE, the ECHR concluded that "the notice-and-take-down system could function in many cases as an appropriate tool for balancing the rights and interests of all those involved."
143 Therefore, if the specifics of Delfi do not apply and the comments to be removed are "offensive and vulgar" rather than hate speech, 144 the Court saw "no reason to hold that [the noticeand-take-down] system could not have provided a viable avenue to protect the commercial reputation of the plaintiff."
145 In this case, MTE-the Hungarian association of Internet service providers-posted an article highlighting unethical business practices by a real estate company, which prompted negative comments.
146 In Pihl v. Sweden, the ECHR confirmed the previous reasoning-and that size matters-by rejecting the claims of an applicant who had been the subject of a defamatory online comment published on a blog. The Court reasoned that no proactive monitoring à la Delfi was to be imposed against the defendant because although the comment had been offensive, it had not amounted to hate speech or an incitement to violence; it had been posted on a small blog run by a non-profit association; it had been taken down the day after the applicant had made a complaint; and it had only been on the blog for around nine days." 31 Still, proactive and automated monitoring and filtering-although narrowly applied-gets singled out by the ECHR as a privileged tool to tame the "untamable monster" or the "internet threat," as mentioned previously. 147 Anonymity becomes a possible representation of the "untamable monster" to be slayed, rather than a feature of online freedom of expression to be nourished.
148 Interestingly, of defamatory and "unreliable" content in threads found on its site-it was not necessary for Channel 2 to know that each thread was defamatory, but it was sufficient that Channel 2 had the knowledge that there was a risk that such transmissions/posts could be defamatory). the Court seems to set a threshold for proactive monitoring based on popularity as in the Baidu case. Delfi-the Court noted in imposing its "higher-thanaverage risk" standard-could have realized that the article might have caused negative reactions because readers and commenters had a great deal of interest in the matter, as shown by the above average number of comments posted on the article. 149 In the process, over-enforcement-caused by automated filteringchallenges freedom of expression.
150 Again, the role of intermediaries is blurred with that of entities obligated to police the net for infringing activities. But is it their role? E. Legislation 32 Legislatively mandated proactive monitoring obligations to curb online copyright infringement might soon follow in the footsteps of voluntary measures already adopted by major platforms and case law. For reasons of space, this article touches only briefly on these proposals, which nonetheless must be mentioned for sake of structural completeness. A detailed review of these proposals, however, is included in other writings of this author cited below.
33 Proactive monitoring-and filtering-sits on top of the rightsholders' wish list both in the United States and Europe. 151 In particular, a recent proposal included in the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Draft Directive would impose on intermediaries the implementation of effective content recognition technologies to prevent the availability of infringing content.
152 The Commission's copyright proposal would require platforms that provide access to "large amounts" of user-generated content to incorporate an automated filtering system. The proposal specifically refers to technologies such as YouTube's Content ID or other automatic infringement assessment systems. 153 Apparently, the proposal would force hosting providers to develop 37 According to this argument, a negligence-based system would serve users fundamental rights. As Van Eecke mentioned, "the notice-and-take-down procedure is one of the essential mechanisms through which the eCommerce Directive achieves a balance between the interests of rightholders, online intermediaries and users." 162 Although imperfect as it is, a notice-and-take-down mechanism embeds a fundamental safeguard for freedom of information as long as it forces intermediaries to actually consider the infringing nature of the materials before coming to a final decision whether to take them down. Replacing knowledge or notice-andtake-down with filtering and monitoring obligations would by default bring about chilling effects.
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In Netlog and Scarlet Extended, the CJEU explained that filtering measures and monitoring obligations would fail to strike a 'fair balance' between copyright and other fundamental rights. 163 In particular, they would undermine users' freedom of expression. 164 Users' freedom to receive and impart information would be struck by the proposal. Automatic infringement assessment systems might undermine the enjoyment of users' exceptions and limitations. 165 Although changes in technology move fast and unpredictably, since fair use is at heart an equitable doctrine, the assumption that, judgment is not programmable might still remain valid for some time. Indeed, the capacity of neural networks to develop more accurate models of many phenomena-maybe even some or most fair uses-might change these assumptions in the future. In general, it was noted that "the design of copyright enforcement robots encodes a series of policy choices made by platforms and rightsholders and, as a result, subjects online speech and cultural participation to a new layer of private ordering and private control." 169 According to Matthew Sag, automatic copyright filtering systems-upon which private agreements between rightholders and online platforms are predicated-"not only return platforms to their gatekeeping role, but encode that role in algorithms and software."
170
In turn, automatic filtering supersedes the safe harbour system and fair use only nominally applies online.
171 In practice, private agreements and automatic filtering determine online behaviour far more "than whether that conduct is, or is not, substantively in compliance with copyright law." of the freedom of the hosting service provider to conduct its business." 173 Hosting providers' freedom of business would be disproportionally affected since an obligation to adopt filtering technologies would require the ISP to install a complicated, costly and permanent system at its own expense. 174 In addition, according to the ECJ, this obligation would be contrary to Article 3 of the Enforcement Directive, providing that "procedures and remedies necessary to ensure the enforcement of the intellectual property rights [. . .] shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly [and] shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade."
175 UPC Telekabel also raised the issue-but less clearly-of cost of enforcement in the context of access providers. It noted that imposing costs on the access provider would limit their freedom to conduct a business, in particular by requiring to "take measures which may represent a significant cost for him, have a considerable impact on the organisation of his activities or require difficult and complex technical solutions," 176 even though he is not the perpetrator of the infringement which has led to the adoption of that injunction.
177
Finally, however, UPC Telekabel came down with a mixed response by suggesting that access providers "can choose to put in place measures which are best adapted to the resources and abilities available," 178 although they should "not be required to make unbearable sacrifices."
179 Notably, the Paris Court of Appeal in Allostreaming-which was mentioned earlier-disregarded these arguments, while imposing costs of blocking and delisting on online intermediaries alone. Similarly, Dafra and Mosley denied Google "technical impossibility" defense and claims against proactive monitoring based on cost efficiency arguments.
41 Finally, apparently, the unqualified deployment of filtering and monitoring obligations will impinge also on the service user's right to protection of personal data. In the SABAM cases, the ECJ has authoritatively already outlined the inappropriateness of these measures against fundamental rights also in this scenario. As the ECJ concluded:
requiring installation of the contested filtering system would involve the identification, systematic analysis and processing get mauled by algorithmic enforcement, trampling over fair uses, the public domain, right of critique, and silencing speech according to the mainstream ethical discourse. The upcoming reform-and the broader move that it portends-might finally slay "no monitoring obligations" and fundamental rights, rather than the untameable monster. Ultimately, the current and proposed enforcement strategies are assuming to slay the untameable monster with potions and enchantments, rather than empirical evidence.
